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I. INTRODUCTION
The Beaufort Sea has an unusually sensitive ecological system.
Offshore oil and gas resource development threatens the stability of
that system by increasing the risk of pollutants entering the Beaufort.
The risks to the environment posed by oil exploration in the Beaufort
region should have provided the impetus for the creation of a compre-
hensive oil spill liability and compensation regime between the govern-
ments of Canada, the United States, and the state of Alaska. Despite
these risks, no such regime exists. Progress in creating an effective
regime, one that accounts for the potential magnitude of environmen-
tal damage in the Beaufort Sea, has proceeded haphazardly at best.
Competing jurisdictional interests and environmental policies have
prevented the attainment of a mutual resolution that provides ade-
quate protection for the Beaufort Sea and those dependent upon it.
This article compares the contours of relief currently available
under Alaska, federal, and Canadian law in the event of an oil spill. It
examines the points at which these laws intersect, illustrates why the
existing window of relief is insufficient, and proposes a few practical
measures to address the inadequacies. Part II of this article assesses
the environmental risks attendant to offshore operations in the
Beaufort Sea. Part III examines various provisions of the Alaska, fed-
eral, and Canadian oil spill liability schemes. The section also reviews
the issues that dominate federal-state relations in this area, namely
preemption and jurisdiction, and addresses the international dimen-
sions of oil pollution in the Beaufort. Finally, Part IV discusses the
inadequacies of existing laws, principally those concerning compensa-
tion and restoration of the environment, and suggests methods of deal-
ing with those inadequacies.
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II. HISTORY AND RISKS OF OFFSHORE AcTIVITIES IN THE
BEAUFORT SEA
The Beaufort Sea, the waters of the Canadian Northern Archipel-
ago, and the Chukchi Sea compose the High Arctic - one of the most
inhospitable environments on earth. With a seabed that averages a
depth of fifty meters, the Beaufort qualifies as one of the shallowest
seas in the world.1 The continental shelf of the Beaufort extends
nearly sixty nautical miles seaward from the North Slope of Alaska
and the neighboring Mackenzie River Valley in Canada, and is essen-
tially the same oil province as the productive Prudhoe Bay.2
Daunting environmental conditions have not deterred exploration
for oil in the Beaufort. Exploration in the Mackenzie Delta dates back
to the early 1960's. Vigorous offshore operations began in 1973 when
favorable geological conditions for petroliferous formations were first
observed in the Beaufort's continental shelf.3
Three major fields exist in the Beaufort.4 Drilling operations are
undertaken in two distinct areas, each of which present engineering
and technical difficulties. The JAGO Basin and the ARCO Anomolie
constitute the "landfast" zone where the Beaufort Sea thaws during
the brief summer. This area is close to shore, but not shallow enough
to allow for pier-rigs. As a result, drillers construct artificial islands
on mounted rigs.5 Over twenty artificial islands have been built.6 The
1. See D. PIMLOTr, D. BROWN & K. SAM, OIL UNDER THE ICE 30 (1976).
2. Various estimates of recoverable oil and gas offshore have been made. In
1974, the Alaska Department of Energy estimated reserves of 2.7 billion barrels of oil
and 13.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. Alaska Tops in Oil Reserve, OFFSHORE, Feb. 1982,
at 64, 69. This estimate did not include the relevant production figures from Prudhoe
Bay on Alaska's North Slope. The Prudhoe Bay field is the twelfth largest field ever
discovered in the world and the largest in North America. It qualifies as a "super
giant" field, containing at least a trillion barrels of recoverable oil. Id. One group
estimated that the amount of oil contained in the Beaufort find would equal that of oil
and gas known to exist in North America. Id. at 69.
3. See generally T. BERGER, NORTHERN FRONTIER, NORTHERN HOMELAND:
THE REPORT OF THE MACKENZIE VALLEY PIPELINE INQUIRY 67-69 (1977); D.
PIMLOTT, D. BROWN & K. SAM, supra note 1, at 31-32.
4. Frederick, La delimitation du plateau continental entre le Canada et les Etats-
Unis dans la mer de Beaufort, 17 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 30, 34 (1979). The JAGO Basin
and the ARCO Anomolie are just off the islands sheltering the Mackenzie River delta
in Canada. The major field, the MARSH Anticlinal, straddles the 141 degree merid-
ian and lies approximately 50 miles farther out to sea.
5. These "environmental structures" are expensive gravel islands, which cost
one million dollars a vertical foot, and thus are uneconomic in waters exceeding 30
meters in depth. D. PIMLOTT, D. BROWN & K. SAM, supra note I, at 30-34. There-
fore, it is expensive to produce oil from the Beaufort Sea. Judicial notice of the ex-
traordinary expenses associated with exploration and production in the Beaufort was
taken in Village of Kaktovik v. Corps of Eng'rs, 9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
20,117, 20,122, 12 Envt. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1740, 1750 (D. Alaska 1978) (noting that
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second drilling area, the "shear" zone, contains the MARSH field.
The shear zone is a ten-kilometer-wide swath of ocean area in which
the slowly rotating permanent pack-ice from the north grinds against
the landfast seasonal ice in winter. Because these waters are open dur-
ing the summer, drillers may anchor ice-reinforced ships. In very deep
water, the drillers use floating, pre-cast concrete caissons able to with-
stand the ice-scour. 7 The drilling season for these operations lasts less
than 122 days.8
Despite the inherent financial risks of oil exploration in the
Beaufort, many expect drilling efforts to intensify.9 This prediction
likely will arouse fears of environmental damage. Several factors com-
bine to make a pollution incident of catastrophic proportions a real
possibility. First, the Beaufort Sea is a zone of abnormally high geo-
static pressure. Gas hydrates, when "thawed" due to contact with
warm drilling muds, release gas of exponentially increasing pressures
that endangers safe oil operations.' 0 Escaping gas has resulted in a
number of oil well blowouts in the Arctic and is likely to cause many
more. 1 Blowout risks have been assessed variously as two in every
1,000 wells drilled (as predicted by environmentalists) 12 to one in
every 20,000 wells drilled (an oil company estimate).
costs of exploratory wells averaged $8-20 million, while production costs ranged from
$400 million to $1 billion).
6. Edmiston, Arctic Design and Operations, 21 OCEAN INDUSTRY 16, 17 (1986).
See also D. PIMLOTr, D. BROWN & K. SAM, supra note 1, at 30-34.
7. See T. BERGER, supra note 3, at 67-68.
8. Brooks, Beaufort Sea Oil: The Costs of Production, 8 N. PERSP. 2, 3 (1980).
9. See generally Edmiston, supra note 6. Dome Petroleum Co. plans to continue
construction of its arctic petroleum and loading atolls, which are massive artificial
islands that support production facilities and harbor special ice-breaking tankers. Id.
at 17. On Alaska's Beaufort shelf, construction of artificial islands has been the sub-
ject of some controversy. The Corps of Engineers opposed ARCO's request for a
permit to build a gravel causeway to the offshore Lisburne field. Id. at 19; see also
Village of Kaktovik v. Corps of Eng'rs, 9 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,123,
12 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1752-53 (refusing to enjoin Exxon's construction of a
gravel drilling pad). Proposals for a deepwater port off the Mackenzie Delta are now
being considered. Edmiston, supra note 6, at 18. The United States planned to offer
leases out to the 200-meter isobath in the Beaufort, and bidding on these areas indi-
cates the confidence of the industry that recovery operations can proceed. Id. In
1986, the federal government initiated plans to auction one tract, Sale 97 in the Diapir
Field, in water depths beyond that traditionally drilled in the Beaufort. No new lease
sales in the Beaufort by the State of Alaska are scheduled until 1987. Id.
10. D. PIMLOTr, D. BROWN & K. SAM, supra note 1, at 104-05.
11. Two Panarctic gas wells ignited in 1969. Crews worked three months to ex-
tinguish one of them and nine months to bring the other under control. A. MILNE,
OIL ICE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 40 (1979). Dome Petroleum Co. reported two inci-
dents in the Beaufort in 1976. One blowout contaminated fresh water, while the other
was contained below the surface. T. BERGER, supra note 3, at 69.
12. A. MILNE, supra note 11, at 39-40.
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The second factor that increases the risk of a catastrophic pollu-
tion incident in the Beaufort is the extreme sensitivity of the Beaufort's
ecological system. Because the Beaufort is a shallow sea, its weather
conditions, its fauna, and its ecosystem are delicately balanced. 13 The
hydrography of the area features a slow-moving current that intensi-
fies along the north coast of Alaska. An oil slick would be caught up
in this current and would affect the ecological balance of both the shelf
and land areas.14 Because the Arctic ecosystem is young and unstable,
an oil spill would adversely affect the whole pattern of reproduction.
Oil also has lethal, sublethal, and synergistic effects on Arctic wildlife.
Although the Beaufort Sea has no potential as a commercial fishery, it
remains a habitat for Bowhead and Gray whales, both endangered
species. I s Should a spill occur, these whales might die by eating con-
taminated food, by suffocating, or by contracting pneumonia.' 6 One
potential result of an offshore accident is truly apocalyptic: an oil spill
could reduce the albedo, or reflectivity, of the ice, inhibit new ice for-
mation, and promote greater heat absorption.' 7 The result would be a
melting of the pack-ice and potentially widespread climatic changes.
Spills in the Beaufort Sea would also be extraordinarily difficult to
clean up. Frigid temperatures would render ineffective chemical dis-
persants and absorbant materials like straw, synthetics, and peatmoss.
Sinking the oil would adversely affect organisms on the seabed, while
burning the oil would prove nearly impossible and potentially counter-
productive in the extreme cold. Clean-up operations might have to be
undertaken in the complete darkness of the Arctic winter and would
be hindered by ice.'s Oil would tend to spread under the ice and col-
lect in pockets. 19 When emulsified, the oil would become entrained
13. See generally T. BERGER, supra note 3, at 70-71.
14. A. MILNE, supra note 11, at 15-16.
15. 0. YOUNG, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL:
THE CASE OF THE NORTH PACIFIC 60 (1977); Dunbar, On the Fishery Potential of the
Sea Waters of the Canadian North, 12 ARCTIC 150, 153 (1970).
16. See 1 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FI-
NAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, PROPOSED FEDERAL/STATE OIL AND
GAS LEASE SALE BEAUFORT SEA 234 (1979) [hereinafter EIS]. See also T. BERGER,
supra note 3, at 67, 71 (quoting Sam Raddi, President of the Committee for Original
Peoples Entitlement).
17. A. MILNE, supra note 11, at 85-103.
18. Id. at 82-83.
19. Id. at 55-56. Most of the Beaufort is ice-free for one to two months of the
year. During the summer, however, ice floes can entirely cover an area that was clear
a week before. DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF CANADA, DRILLING IN
ARCTIC WATERS 390 (1971). Ice thickness reaches its maximum in May with seven
feet of new ice covering ten to fifteen feet of old ice. Floes can move at speeds of two
knots per hour. Ice damage presents a significant danger to oil installations. See gen-
erally A. MILNE, supra note 11, at 50-55. In response, some drillers have restricted
drilling to the summer months. On the United States shelf, drilling is permitted only
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with the ice, prove impossible to burn or absorb, and likely leave a
thick residue best removed by a shovel. 20 Drifting ice would then
leave a trail of oil and prevent a localized cleanup.
A number of factors combine to make it possible for oil spilled in
the Beaufort to persist for centuries and thereby prolong the exposure
of sensitive marine organisms to the dangerous conditions.21 First, de-
composition is vastly slowed in the Arctic. This means that virtually
no biochemical decay of oil will occur. Second, the Beaufort Sea re-
mains stagnant in the winter. Third, the low evaporation rates in the
Beaufort Sea region are insufficient to affect the highly toxic lighter
fractions of crude oil.22
This exposition shows that the conditions for offshore operations
in the Beaufort are unique and pose what might be insurmountable
environmental dangers. As one court concluded: "Its precarious en-
vironment means that the resources of the Beaufort Sea will doubtless
prove difficult to assay, develop, and protect. Life [there] is nasty,
brutish, and sometimes short."'2 3 It is thus possible that a pollution
incident will occur that will have both domestic and international
effects.
III. SURVEY OF CURRENT LEGAL SCHEMES
The governments of the United States, Canada, and the state of
Alaska have created separate statutory schemes to deal with the
problems that will arise in the event of an oil spill in the Beaufort Sea.
Because the United States-Canadian boundary in the Beaufort remains
in dispute, all three statutory schemes could be invoked. To determine
the applicable law, one must analyze each issue addressed by both fed-
eral and state law in light of the federal preemption doctrine. In the
disputed areas, the principles of international law also must be ana-
lyzed. This section first examines and compares the scope and appli-
cation of the domestic schemes. An analysis of the possible
from April I to October 31 outside the barrier islands, and from May 16 to October 31
inside the islands if safe operation can be demonstrated. These restrictions were incor-
porated in the relevant federal lease agreements and were noted in the Alaska
Supreme Court's decision in Hammond v. North Slope Borough, 645 P.2d 750, 755
(Alaska 1982). Since the Beaufort is an enclosed sea, ice movements can usually be
predicted accurately. But the mere ability to predict these movements does not pre-
vent them from sweeping away a pipeline, a sub-sea well completion, or even a rig. D.
PIMLOTr, D. BROWN & K. SAM, supra note 1, at 48-50. Ice also limits access. If a
blowout were to occur late in the summer, there would be no time to drill a relief well
before the pack-ice encroached. T. BERGER, supra note 3, at 68.
20. A. MILNE, supra note 11, at 82-83.
21. See EIS, supra note 16, at 178-79.
22. Id.
23. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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implications of the continuing boundary controversy between the
United States and Canada follows.
A. Domestic Schemes
Within the United States sector of the Beaufort Sea, liability and
compensation for oil spills depend on two sets of interlocking and, in
some contexts, competing regulations. Both the Alaska and federal
plans address the issues of cleanup, compensation, penalties, and fi-
nancial responsibility. "Cleanup" refers to those measures taken to
remove an oil spill and restore the environment to its previous condi-
tion. Compensation and liability rules are intended to assign responsi-
bility for an oil spill. These rules also enable private parties to
maintain an action, often through public financing, for additional eco-
nomic losses incurred. "Penalties" are civil and criminal sanctions
designed to punish corporate irresponsibility after a pollution incident.
By contrast, "financial responsibility" refers to insurance plans that
require offshore operators at the outset to post adequate guarantees of
their ability to meet potential liability. The subsections below outline
these four issues. A discussion of the jurisdictional conflicts regarding
federal preemption and state territorial waters follows.
1. Clean-up, Removal and Restoration Provisions.
a. Federal Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund. The Offshore Oil
Spill Pollution Fund ("OSPF")24 establishes a compensation fund
("Fund") for reimbursement of costs associated with cleaning up oil
spills. The OSPF holds the owner or operator of an offshore facility
strictly liable to state and federal governments for the costs of remov-
ing spilled oil.25 Removal costs include the expenses of reasonable
measures taken after an oil spill to prevent, minimize, or mitigate the
resultant pollution. 26 Technically, any party may assert this type of
claim. If a private claimant seeks reimbursement of reasonable costs
of removal, however, an owner or operator may escape liability by
proving the sole cause of the incident was war, natural disaster, or the
24. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1824 (1982).
25. The Oil Spill Pollution Fund ("OSPF") imposes strict liablity for removal
costs incurred by state and federal governments on the owner and operator of any
vessel or facility that is the source of pollution. Id. § 1814(d).
26. Id. § 1811(14). Apparently, this definition does not encompass costs incurred
in a "pure threat" situation where ameliorative measures are taken in time to prevent
an actual spill of oil. Clean-up costs must be both reasonable-approximately equal to
the market value of similar goods and services-and actual-really incurred. H.R.
REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 179, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 1450, 1584.
[Vol. 4:37
OIL POLLUTION
intentional or negligent acts of a third party.27 In addition, the owner
or operator's liability to a private claimant for removal costs may be
limited in the absence of willful misconduct or gross negligence.2
Owners and operators may also claim reimbursement for removal
costs if they are entitled to one of the defenses against a private claim-
ant.29 If the owner or operator is not eligible for exoneration, only
those funds in excess of the applicable liability ceiling may be
requested. 30
In most cases, governmental entities, not private parties, initiate
clean-up operations. The defenses and limitations on liability gener-
ally available to owners and operators in an action for economic loss
or cleanup by a private party31 are not available when the entity seek-
ing reimbursement is the federal government or any state or local offi-
cial agency.32 Under the federal scheme, the owner or operator of the
source of the oil pollution is absolutely liable to such governmental
agency in full for all costs of removal. In the event the owner or oper-
ator is financially unable to meet this obligation fully, the entity incur-
ring clean-up expenses may present a claim under the OSPF3 3 up to
the Fund's $200,000,000 limit.34 A claim for injury or destruction of
natural resources (as distinct from loss of use) may be asserted only by
the Secretaries of Commerce or Interior for federally managed re-
sources or the appropriate state agency for state controlled re-
sources.35 The sums recovered are available to restore, rehabilitate, or
acquire resources equivalent to the damaged natural resources and are
not limited to the actual replacement cost of the resources lost.36 It
27. 43 U.S.C. § 1814(c) (1982).
28. Id. § 1814(b). The limitation of liability for total removal and clean-up costs
is $35,000,000 in the case of an offshore facility and $250,000 or $300 per gross ton,
whichever is greater, in the case of a vessel. These limitations, however, do not apply
if the incident was caused by the willful misconduct or gross negligence of one in
privity with the owner or operator. Id.
29. Id. § 1813(b)(1)(A).
30. Id. § 1813(b)(1)(B).
31. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
32. 43 U.S.C. § 1814(d) (1982).
33. Id. § 1817(d). The OSPF is also available to private claimants not compen-
sated fully because of the limitation of liability of owners and operators. Id.
34. The Fund is to be maintained at a level not greater than $200,000,000. Id.
§ 1812(a). The Fund is designed not to fall below the level of $100,000,000. Id.
§ 1812(d)(2). Payments in excess of $100,000 must be approved by the Secretary of
Transportation. Id. § 1817(g)(2).
35. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(3) (1982). The OSPF vested in the President the author-
ity to assert these particular claims. Id. § 1813(b)(3). This power was delegated to the
named cabinet officials. See Exec. Order No. 12,123, 44 Fed. Reg. 11,199 (1982),
reprinted in 43 U.S.C. § 1811 (1982).
36. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(3) (1982). See H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess.
179, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1450, 1588. See also Puerto
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seems, however, that limitations on liability and defenses may apply to
a governmental damage action for destruction of natural resources. 37
Here too, the Fund is available for any amount not compensated by
the owner or operator. 38
b. Alaska legislation. The Alaska scheme39 imposes liability for
cleanup on a somewhat broader category of persons than does the fed-
eral scheme, including anyone who causes or permits specified levels of
oil to be discharged into the territorial jurisdiction of Alaska waters. 40
Like the federal scheme, the Alaska provisions subject a polluter to
unlimited liability to the state for the full amount of actual damages.
Actual damages include direct and indirect costs "associated with the
abatement, containment, or removal of the pollutant, restoration of
the environment to its former state, and all incidental administrative
costs." '41 Alaska, however, limits eligibility for the recovery of clean-
up expenses to the state.42 Under both the federal and Alaska
schemes, only the state may recover damages for the restoration of
natural resources, including fish and wildlife.43
No defenses are available to the polluter against state claims for
the recovery of clean-up or restoration costs, although the polluter can
assert such defenses in response to the imposition of penalties.44 In
addition, the Alaska scheme places no limitation on polluter liability
for the actual expenses of cleanup and restoration but does put a cap
on penalties. 45 Alaska also provides for an "overage" fund similar to
the federal scheme, but apparently limits its availability to the state
Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 676-78 (1st Cir. 1980) (noting that in
Puerto Rico's planned restoration of a damaged mangrove swamp, a portion of the
damages could be allocated to replacement of wild birds or game that would not be
expected to regenerate within a relatively finite period), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981).
37. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. Only in the case of a govern-
mental claim for removal costs do the limitation on liability and owner/operator de-
fenses not apply. 43 U.S.C. § 1814(d) (1982). Damages for injury to or destruction of
natural resources do not clearly fall into this category. See id. § 1813(a)(2)(C), (b)(3).
38. 43 U.S.C. § 1817(d) (1982).
39. ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.710-.850, .04.010-.120 (1982 & Supp. 1986).
40. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.760(e) (Supp. 1986).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(3) (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.780 (Supp. 1986).
44. In an action for recovery of clean-up expenses or restoration costs, the pol-
luter is liable for the full amount. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.760(e), .780 (Supp.
1986). Defenses that are similar to those provided in the federal scheme are available
only in actions brought under the penalty provisions. Id. § 46.03.758(h); see infra text
accompanying note 78.
45. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.760(c), .780 (Supp. 1986). But cf. ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.03.758(e) (Supp. 1986) (providing limitation of $100,000,000 on penalties), dis-
cussed infra text accompanying note 73.
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and qualifying municipalities for amounts not recovered from the
polluter.46
2. Compensation and Liability.
a. Federal Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund. In addition to reim-
bursement for costs of removal, owners and operators are liable for the
following six varieties of damages under the OSPF: (1) injury or de-
struction of real or personal property; (2) loss of use of property;
(3) injury or destruction of natural resources; (4) loss of use of natural
resources; (5) loss of profits; and (6) loss of tax revenues. 47
Any "United States claimant" may assert a claim for loss relating
to real or personal property, or for the loss of use of natural re-
sources48 as distinct from a claim for destruction of natural re-
sources.49 Damages for lost profits and impairment of earnings also
are available to all United States claimants. Recovery for lost profits
and impairment of earnings, however, is limited to those parties who
derive at least twenty-five percent of their earnings from activities that
utilize the damaged property or natural resource.50 All wages, earn-
ings, and profits, not just net income or net profits, are included in the
computation of the twenty-five percent minimum.5 1 Only the federal
government or any state or political subdivision may raise a claim for
loss of tax revenues. 52
Claims may be asserted against either the offshore operator or the
guarantor offering proof of financial responsibility for the facility.53
The guarantor is permitted to invoke all of the rights and defenses
available to the owner or operator.5 4 If the incident resulted solely
46. A general state fund provides for oil and hazardous substance clean-up costs
incurred by the state and its municipalities. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.04.010 (Supp.
1986). The "oil and hazardous substance release mitigation account" ("mitigation
account") is funded by money recovered from the polluter for containment, as well as
fines, penalties, and damages recovered by the state for oil or hazardous substance
spills. Id. § 46.04.020 (Supp. 1986). Municipalities are entitled to reimbursement
from the account if the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation finds that such
expenses are necessary to respond to an oil release that threatens the public health or
welfare or the environment. Id. § 46.04.070(c).
47. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2) (1982).
48. Id. § 1813(b)(2).
49. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
50. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(4) (1982).
51. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 179, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 1450, 1588.
52. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(5) (1982).
53. Id. § 1815(c). See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
54. 43 U.S.C. § 1815(c) (1982).
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from an act of war, God, or a negligent third party, the owner/opera-
tor escapes liability.55 Moreover, where the facts do not support a
finding of gross negligence or willful misconduct, certain limitations
on liability apply.56 In the case of an owner or operator of a vessel, the
statute limits financial responsibility to $250,000 or $300 per ton,
whichever is greater.57 A thirty-five million dollar limitation on liabil-
ity applies if the polluter owned or operated an offshore facility.58
Even if the offshore operator or vessel owner acts negligently or will-
fully, the guarantor can avoid liability by proving that the willful mis-
conduct of another caused the incident.59
When an offshore operator denies liability for oil pollution dam-
age or otherwise fails to satisfy a claim within sixty days of presenta-
tion, individual claimants must choose between proceeding with a civil
action against the operator or presenting the claim to the Fund.60
This decision is irrevocable and exclusive. 61 When the operator's set-
tlement does not fully satisfy a claim because of limitations on liability
or insolvency, a claimant may present the balance to the Fund.62 In
these circumstances, the Fund acts as an overage insurer. If the Fund
denies liability under the OSPF, a claimant may submit the dispute to
the Secretary of Transportation for arbitration.63 The claimant may
commence a court action against the Fund when arbitration fails to
resolve the matter.64
b. Alaska legislation. The Alaska damage and liability provisions
hold persons owning or having control over a "hazardous" substance
that enters state waters strictly liable to injured third parties.65 "Haz-
ardous" substance is statutorily defined as including oil.66 Damages
under the Alaska scheme include three of the six varieties covered by
federal law: (1) injury to real or personal property; (2) loss of income;
and (3) loss of economic benefit.67 As in the federal scheme, a polluter
is relieved of liability to third parties if he can prove that the spill
resulted solely from acts of war, God, or a negligent or willful act of a
55. Id. § 1814(c).
56. Id. § 1814(b).
57. Id. § 1814(b)(1).
58. Id. § 1814(b)(2).
59. Id. § 1815(c).
60. Id. § 1817(a), (b).
61. Id. § 1817(c).
62. Id. § 1817(d).
63. Id. § 1817(f).
64. Id.
65. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822 (1982).
66. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.826(4)(B) (Supp. 1986).
67. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.824 (1982).
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third party (including the Alaska and United States governments). 68
Contrary to the OSPF, the statute apparently lacks a limitation on
owner or operator liability as well as a mechanism for private individ-
uals to collect uncompensated damages.
3. Penalty Provisions.
a. Federal Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund. The Fund is pri-
marily derived from fees imposed on the owners of oil drilled on the
outer continental shelf. Fees are not to exceed three cents per barrel
and are set so as to maintain the Fund at a level of $100,000,000 to
$200,000,000.69 In addition to these nonpunitive fees, the statute pro-
vides for penalties of up to $10,000.70 These penalties, however, are
imposed for failing to pay the statutory fee and not for any actual
discharge of oil.71 Thus, the real penalty for oil discharge in the fed-
eral scheme lies in its exposure of owners and operators to liability for
cleanup and compensation. 72
b. Alaska legislation. In sharp contrast to the federal system,
penalty provisions play a major role in the Alaska scheme. Alaska
imposes penalties upon any person causing or permitting a pollution
discharge. If the discharge rises above 18,000 gallons of oil, additional
persons are penalized. 73 The Alaska scheme provides two sets of pen-
alty provisions in order to create a "meaningful incentive for the safe
handling of oil." 74
Under the first set of penalty provisions, a polluter may be held
liable on a per gallon charge that varies with the nature of the body of
water polluted. Ten dollars per gallon is assessed for oil entering
freshwater environments; $2.50 per gallon is charged for oil entering
estuarine, intertidal, or confined saltwater environments; and one dol-
lar per gallon is assessed for oil entering unconfined saltwater areas
and environments without significant aquatic resources.75 If the pol-
luter acted with gross negligence or discharged intentionally, the per
gallon penalty may be increased five-fold.76 A one hundred million
dollar limit applies to discharges in excess of 18,000 gallons. One hun-
dred million dollars is, in effect, the highest penalty that the state can
68. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.758(h) (Supp. 1986).
69. 43 U.S.C. § 1812(d)(1), (2) (1982).
70. Id. § 1812(d)(3)(A).
71. Id.
72. See supra notes 25-38, 47-54 and accompanying text.
73. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.758(e) (Supp. 1986).
74. Id. § 46.03.758(a)(2).
75. Id. § 46.03.758(b)(1).
76. Id. § 46.03.758(b)(2).
1987]
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
impose. 7 A polluter who proves that the spill resulted solely from
acts of war, God, or a negligent or willful act of a third party may
escape liability for the penalty.78
As an alternative to the above environmentally-graded penalty, a
pollution discharger may be subject to civil penalties of "not less than
$500 nor more than $100,000 for the initial violation, nor more than
$5,000 for each day thereafter on which the violation continues. '79
The court can adjust these penalties to take into account reasonable
compensation for any adverse environmental effects caused by the vio-
lation, 0 the state's costs in investigating the violation,81 and the eco-
nomic savings realized by the violator in not complying with the
statute.82 Non-willful violations are classified as Class B misdemean-
ors, while willful violations constitute Class A misdemeanors. 83 Any
amount of oil removed by a polluter is deductible from the total
amount of penalties imposed.8 4
4. Financial Responsibility Requirements.
a. Federal Offshore Oil Spill Pollution Fund. Under the OSPF,
owners and operators of oil-carrying vessels and offshore facilities
must furnish proof of financial responsibility to the extent of the appli-
cable level of limitations on liability. 85 Owners and operators may sat-
isfy this responsibility through any combination of insurance,
guarantee, surety bond, or self-insurance.8 6 Thus, a vessel owner or
operator need only show proof of responsiblity up to the greater of
$250,000 or $300 per ton,87 and an offshore operator or owner must
77. Id. § 46.03.758(e).
78. Id. § 46.03.758(h).
79. Id. § 46.03.760(a).
80. Id. § 46.03.760(a)(1). These damages will be determined according to the
"toxicity, degradability and dispersal characteristics of the substance discharged, the
sensitivity of the receiving environment, and the degree to which the discharge de-
grades existing environmental quality." Id.
81. Id. § 46.03.760(a)(2).
82. Id. § 46.03.760(a)(3). "Economic savings" is defined as "that sum which a
person would be required to expend for the planning, acquisition, siting, construction,
installation, and operation of facilities necessary to effect compliance with the stan-
dard violated." Id. § 46.03.760(d).
83. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.790 (Supp. 1986). A false representation made with
respect to the requirements of this statute is punishable by a fine of not more than
$25,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Id,
§ 46.03.790(e)(3).
84. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.758(f) (Supp. 1986).
85. 43 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(1) (1982).
86. Id.
87. See id. § 1814(b)(1).
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obtain $35,000,000 worth of coverage. s8 Proof of these levels of finan-
cial responsibility is satisfactory regardless of the ultimate availability
of liability limitations.8 9 As previously mentioned, no limitation on
liability for clean-up and removal costs in an action by the state exists
under the federal scheme.90
b. Alaska legislation. The Alaska financial responsibility require-
ments resemble the federal provisions in a number of respects. Issu-
ance of a permit for offshore exploration or a production facility
requires proof of financial responsibility up to a minimum of
$35,000,000 per incident.91 Financial responsibility takes the form of
demonstrated insurance, self-insurance, surety, or guarantee.92 Con-
trary to federal law, Alaska does not define its financial responsibility
requirements in terms of any limitations on liability. Thus, polluter
assets above the required level, if any, appear to be within the reach of
claimants. The Alaska statutes also provide for direct action against
insurers and guarantors providing financial responsibility to offshore
operators. 93 Unlike other state statutory schemes, the Alaska legisla-
tion preserves the insurers' right to invoke any substantive defenses
94
available to the insured. 95
5. Federal/State Jurisdictional Conflicts. Conflicts as to the ap-
plicability of federal and Alaska compensation schemes for oil pollu-
tion arise on two discrete levels. The first involves the issue of federal
preemption of state law remedies; the second concerns delineation of
88. See id. § 1814(b)(2).
89. See id. § 1815(a)(1).
90. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
91. ALASKA STAT. § 46.04.040(b) (1982). In 1980, the Alaska legislature ordered
the Department of Environmental Conservation to conduct a survey to determine
whether the $35,000,000 amount was adequate. See Act of July 1, 1980, ch. 116, § 12,
1980 Alaska Sess. Laws (unpaginated). Apparently, the legislature considered this
figure appropriate since no new legislation has been introduced to increase the figure.
92. ALASKA STAT. § 46.04.040(e) (1982). The evidence offered to show financial
responsibility must satisfy the requirements of Alaska's Department of Commerce and
Economic Development. Id.; see also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, §§ 20.005-.105
(Oct. 1981).
93. An action under ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.758, .760(a), (e), .822 (1982 & Supp.
1986) may be brought in a state court directly against the insurer or another person
who provided evidence of financial responsibility. ALASKA STAT. § 46.04.040(e)
(1982). A number of other state statutes allow for direct action. See, e.g., CAL. INS.
CODE § 11,580 (West Supp. 1987); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978).
94. See supra notes 44, 68, and 78 and accompanying text.
95. See 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. Alaska No. 66462 (May 13, 1982) (unpaginated)
(available on LEXIS, States library, Allag file) ("[t]he insurer would 'step into the
shoes' of the insured by being able to assert any substantive defense available to the
insured.").
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Alaska's territorial jurisdiction. Since the Alaska and federal compen-
sation schemes differ in many respects, determining which would pre-
vail in a given situation is vitally important.
a The application of the preemption doctrine. Admiralty law tra-
ditionally has precluded individual parties from claiming recoveries
under both state and federal compensation schemes.96 Nevertheless,
this rule has been relaxed so that federal admiralty law does not pre-
empt all state action.97 The recent trend has been to give state pollu-
tion liability statutes effect unless Congress has manifested a clear
intention to preempt the field or the state statute actually conflicts
with the federal law. 98
Although as yet there has been no examination of state law pre-
emption by the OSPF, preemption analysis under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act's ("FWPCA") similar provisions99 sheds light
on the likely outcome. The oil and hazardous substance provisions of
the FWPCA were designed to provide a quick method of restoration
by imposing liability upon owners and operators of vessels for all ini-
tial clean-up costs, regardless of fault.100 The FWPCA expressly does
not: (1) preempt any state from imposing "any requirement or liabil-
ity with respect to the discharge of oil or hazardous substances into
any waters within such state" or (2) affect "any State or local law not in
conflict" with the Act relative to onshore or offshore facilities. 101
Potential FWPCA preemption of the Alaska oil compensation
scheme was specifically considered by an earlier commentator. 0 2 The
commentator concluded that those portions of the Alaska statute that
did not go beyond the explicit standards set by the FWPCA, along
96. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
97. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
98. In re Allied Towing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398, 404 (E.D. Va. 1979).
99. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
100. Id. § 1321(f)-(i) (owners and operators have limited rights of subrogation
against third parties solely responsible for costs incurred in cleanup and removal).
101. Id. § 1321(o)(2), (3) (emphasis added).
102. Pritchett, Alaska Strict Liability Oil Spill Legislation: What Effect?, 8 UCLA-
ALASKA L. REv. 21 (1978). The article discusses Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), where the Supreme Court ruled that a Florida
statute providing for recovery of clean-up costs and imposing strict liability on water-
front oil-handling facilities was not preempted by the 1970 Water Quality Improve-
ment Act. Following Askew, the Court in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151
(1978), held that state pollution liability statutes will be given effect "unless Congress
has manifested a clear intention to preempt the field or the state statute actually con-
flicts with the federal law." Id. at 157-58. Applying this test, the court in In re Allied
Towing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Va. 1979), held that the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act ("FWPCA") did not preempt Virginia's liability scheme. The court
believed that Congress intended the FWPCA to provide states with an alternative
federal remedy for recovery.
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with those provisions for public and private damages (provided they
arose out of a discharge within Alaska waters), were unlikely to be
preempted.10 3 The issue of liability to private parties for damages
caused by discharge into non-state territorial waters, however, appeared
problematic to this commentator since the state scheme generally ex-
tends liability to benefit private claimants for damage caused by haz-
ardous substances which enter state waters while the FWPCA does
not.' o4
A recent United States Supreme Court decision confirms the ten-
uousness of a state's imposition of liabilities in conflict with the
FWPCA for damage caused by discharge outside of state waters. In
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 105 Vermont residents filed a class
action in common law nuisance against a New York paper mill which
had been discharging pollutants near the Vermont-New York bor-
der. 106 The paper company moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the FWPCA preempted the state law upon which the resi-
dents based the suit. ' 07 The lower court dismissed the motion, holding
that the FWPCA's "saving clause" preserved state actions to redress
pollution in the state where the injury occurred. 10 8
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the saving clause
must be read narrowly, ruling that state law actions based on dis-
charge from point sources in another state are preempted by the Act.
The Court reasoned that "if affected states were allowed to impose
discharge standards on a single point-source, the inevitable result
would be a serious interference with the 'full purposes and objectives
of Congress.' "109 The Court indicated, however, that an action in the
source state under its own laws would not be precluded. 110 Further,
the Court's holding seems limited to laws which attempt to impose
standards that differ from those central to the purposes of the Act and
thus frustrate the uniform application of the FWPCA's standards.11'
103. Pritchett, supra note 102, at 37-38.
104. Id. at 45.
105. 55 U.S.L.W. 4138 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1987).
106. Id. at 4139.
107. Id.
108. Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 274 (D. Vt.), aff'd,
776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987). The
"saving clause" provides: "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any
person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek en-
forcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief. . . ." 33
U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982).
109. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805, 812 (1987) (citing Hills-
borough Co. v. Automated Med. Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)).
110. Id. at 814.
111. Id. at 812.
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Notably, in Ouellette the plaintiffs essentially attempted to use Ver-
mont law to regulate a New York firm.
Under this analysis, since the FWPCA itself does not afford a
private right to compensation, a state scheme which does would not
necessarily be incompatible with the FWPCA's purpose. Unlike an
action in nuisance based on a subjective perception of acceptable emis-
sion, Alaska's private action is based on actual economic injury. Com-
pensation of actual injury would not seem to interfere with emissions
standards set by the FWPCA. As to preemption of the Alaska scheme
by the FWPCA, it appears that the more determinative issue would be
whether the point of discharge is within state territorial jurisdiction. 112
While the Ouellette decision dealt solely with state regulation of
pollutants discharged into the waters of another state, the reasoning
seems equally applicable to state regulation of pollutants discharged
into neutral waters. Thus, where the discharge does not occur within
Alaska territorial waters, state law could be preempted by the
FWPCA.
Since the FWPCA, however, Congress has enacted a more com-
prehensive oil spill compensation scheme. In 1978, the OSPF 113 was
created for the purpose of providing prompt payment of both public
and private damages, as well as costs for removal of oil spilled as a
result of activities on the continental shelf.114 With two clear excep-
tions,1 5 the OSPF uses more liberal language as to the state's ability
to regulate compensation than that found in the FWPCA. Most nota-
bly, the OSPF's preemption provisions open the realm of supplemen-
tary state regulation to redress damage within the state's jurisdiction
regardless of the point of discharge. 116
The OSPF provides that it will not "preempt the field of liability
or ... preclude any state from imposing additional requirements or
liability for any discharge of oil resulting in damage or removal costs
within the jurisdiction of that State."' 7 The OSPF, however, does
explicitly exclude the application of state law in two areas. First, it
precludes a double recovery for the same damage or clean-up
112. For a discussion of state territorial jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying
notes 134-40.
113. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1824 (1982).
114. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 178, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1453, 1584.
115. See infra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
116. 43 U.S.C. § 1820(c) (1982). See also H.R. REp. No. 590, 95th Cong,, 2d Sess.
193, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1453, 1599 ("With the
exception of requirements as to financial responsibility, this title does not preempt the
field of liability and does not prevent any state from imposing oil spill liability laws or
additional requirements.").
117. 43 U.S.C. § 1820(c) (1982).
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claims.1 18 This is simple equity: there should be no "double-dipping"
for a state or its citizens. The second preemption allows offshore oper-
ators to demonstrate their financial responsibility under the federal
statute and ignore any higher state financial responsibility require-
ments. 119 Other than these restrictions, states are virtually unlimited
in their right to create additional oil spill liability without preemption
under the OSPF.120
The OSPF, by its very terms, has no effect on Alaska's ability to
provide for cleanup and restoration of the environment after a spill. 21
Preemption of the Alaska clean-up and restoration provisions would
not be at issue even under the FWPCA.122 Unlike the FWPCA, how-
ever, the OSPF gives private claimants a cause of action for damages
due to oil pollution 23 and allows states to provide for redress of dam-
ages regardless of where the oil originated. 124 Unresolved questions as
to both territorial preemption and potential private actions' 25 do not
appear to be obstacles under the broad-targeted and less preemptive
provisions of the OSPF. Thus Alaska's compensation provisions, both
public and private, are unlikely to be preempted.
The problem is how Alaskans might collect damages awarded,
and in this regard federal preemption is of greater immediacy. The
federal statute unambiguously prevents states from imposing higher
financial responsibility ceilings on operators, except for those opera-
tors actually working within state waters. 126 Since Alaska has fol-
lowed a conservative course in refusing to raise the financial
responsibility requirements above the $35,000,000 federal maxi-
mum, 27 its current provisions are not precluded by the OSPF's
prohibitions. While the fixed financial responsibility limit seems to un-
dercut Alaska's efforts to collect on an offshore operator's liability af-
ter a blowout, in actuality, it may have no such effect. Since offshore
operators in the Beaufort are major oil companies, 28 their assets, un-
like those of "one-ship" tanker concerns, are ample and easily attacha-
ble. This means that Alaska should have no difficulty in executing a
118. Id. § 1820(a).
119. Id. § 1820(b).
120. Alaska, for example, required offshore operators to carry $35,000,000 of in-
surance even before the federal Fund became effective in 1978. See supra note 91.
121. See 43 U.S.C. § 1820(c) (1982).
122. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. See generally Pritchett, supra
note 100.
123. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b) (1982).
124. Id. § 1820(c).
125. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
126. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1815(b), 1820(b) (1982) (setting the federal maximum at
$35,000,000).
127. ALASKA STAT. § 46.04.040(b) (1982); see also supra note 91.
128. See supra note 9.
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judgment against an operator to cover his liability to the state, even if
that liability is much greater than the $35,000,000 responsibility limit.
Furthermore, the state has access to an "oil and hazardous substance
release mitigation account" ("mitigation account") to which it may
resort when assets of a polluter prove insufficient to restore damage. 29
The state mitigation account, like the federal Fund, is designed to
provide for cleanup and restoration when an individual polluter's as-
sets are exhausted. The state account is funded by a system of civil
and criminal penalties of up to $100,000,000130 while the Fund is gen-
erated primarily by a nominal fee imposed upon each barrel of oil pro-
duced.131 Although the federal statute has a $10,000 cap on
penalties,132 there is no implication that states are barred from estab-
lishing their own system of fines. So long as the state continues to
honor the $35,000,000 limit on proof of financial responsibility in col-
lection of its penalties, any preemption challenge to Alaska's method
of funding its mitigation account would likely fail. Absent direct indi-
cation by Congress, 133 any expansion of the use of the state mitigation
account to private claimants would also appear permissible under the
language of the OSPF.
In sum, federal preemption currently should have little practical
effect in limiting Alaska's efforts to enhance its oil pollution scheme.
129. See supra note 46.
130. ALASKA STAT. § 46.08.020(3) (Supp. 1986); see also ALASKA STAT.
§ 46.03.758(b) (1982).
131. 43 U.S.C. § 1812(d)(1) (1982).
132. Id. § 1822(a)(1).
133. Recently proposed legislation would reduce this wide latitude toward state oil
spill statutes. In 1982 the House passed a Comprehensive Oil Spill Liability Act, but
the Senate failed to act on it. See H.R. 5906, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1982). An identi-
cal bill passed the House in 1985, and again the Senate failed to act on it. See H.R.
1232, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). This bill was later incorporated into H.R. 2005,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). As of this writing, the most recently proposed action on
a comprehensive oil spill fund was S. 2340, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), upon which
the Senate has again failed to act. The broad preemption provisions of these bills,
which are likely to be reintroduced in the current session of Congress, might com-
pletely preempt Alaska's appropriation-based funding scheme. This would mean that
funds would not be available for an enhanced clean-up operation, which would be
necessitated if the initial, federally-funded recovery operation was inadequate. A re-
striction of funds would be particularly unfortunate in the case of ongoing clean-up
operations in the Beaufort after a major spill there. Broad preemption provisions
would pose an obstacle to state development of protective compensation programs.
See Oil Pollution Liability: Hearing on H.R. 1232 Before the Subcomm. on Coast
Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 170-72 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Hearings] (testimony of Alaska Gov.
Sheffield).
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The OSPF has no effect on Alaska's clean-up and restoration provi-
sions, nor does it obviously conflict with Alaska's private compensa-
tion provisions. Since the existing state mitigation account available to
the state does not appear to be preempted, it is unlikely that making
this fund available to private claimants would raise preemption con-
cerns, provided Alaska continues to require no more than the federal
level of financial responsibility.
b. Federal/state territorial dispute. As previously indicated, state
territorial jurisdiction at the point of damage may be the more critical
issue in determining federal preemption under the FWPCA.1
34
Although this issue appears less relevant under the OSPF's more lib-
eral focus on the site of damage, rather than of discharge, 135 delinea-
tion of territorial jurisdiction remains pertinent since it is not certain
whether the OSPF supersedes the FWCPA in this respect.1 36 At any
rate, determination of territorial jurisdiction at the point of damage
would be required under either scheme. Resolution of this issue is
crucial because states retain the right to establish whatever compensa-
tion scheme they choose within their territorial waters without consid-
eration of federal preemption. Since an oil spill from an installation
close to shore likely would cause extensive damage to the coastline, a
great incentive exists for states to extend their jurisdiction to reach
near-shore facilities.
The issue of Alaska's territorial jurisdiction is presently before a
Special Master for the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Alaska. 137 The dispute centers around the delimitation of the state's
seaward boundary.1 38 Arguing, among other issues, for recognition of
134. See supra text accompanying note 112.
135. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
136. See 43 U.S.C. § 1814(i) (1982) ("To the extent that they are in conflict or
otherwise inconsistent with any other provision of law relating to liability or the limi-
tation thereof, the provisions of this section shall supersede such other provision of
law .... "). Congress arguably intended that this subsection apply to conflicting pro-
visions of the FWPCA. See H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 308, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1450, 1589 (noting that the OSPF's provi-
sions are significant improvements over the FWPCA).
137. Original No. 84 (U.S. filed Oct. 26, 1979). The Court appointed a special
master to take evidence and make reports to the Court. United States v. Alaska, 444
U.S. 1065 (1980). For a full statement of the issues before the special master, see Joint
Statement of Questions Presented and Contentions of the Parties at 3-5, United States
v. Alaska, Original No. 84 (U.S. filed Oct. 26, 1979) [hereinafter Statement of Ques-
tions Presented].
138. The Alaska Statehood Act made the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 ("SLA")
applicable to the state. See Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 6(m), 72 Stat. 339, 343 (1958). The
SLA granted each state territorial jurisdiction over the submerged lands located
within three miles of its coastline, including submerged lands underlying "inland"
waters. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(2), 131 l(a) (1982). At issue in United States v. Alaska is
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the Dinkum Sands formation as an island, thereby extending the
state's jurisdiction,139 Alaska is unlikely to prevail on any ground now
before the Court. The current baselines were drawn in accordance
with the International Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
tiguous Zone, and Alaska's claims could compromise the United
States' position in its jurisdictional dispute with Canada in the
Beaufort Sea. In light of the international ramifications of the delimi-
tation, the Supreme Court will probably continue its practice of defer-
ring to the findings of the federal government in the drawing of
baselines. 140
B. Liability and Compensation Coordination with Canada
Given the unique environment of the Beaufort Sea, cooperation
between the United States and Canada in fashioning a workable liabil-
ity and compensation regime for oil pollution in this region is impera-
tive. The establishment of such a system will require the resolution of
current jurisdictional questions, the creation of appropriate methods
for joint response to pollution incidents, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, reciprocity between the compensation laws of both nations. In
international disputes, as distinguished from those of a strictly federal
character, issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty are paramount. Nev-
ertheless, United States-Canadian cooperation in the Beaufort is
unique in that simultaneous attempts have been made to resolve juris-
dictional issues and to create a credible liability regime.
Development of a bilateral liability regime between Canada and
the United States has been complicated by the continuing dispute over
the effect of changes in geographical conditions on the characterization of certain ar-
eas as part of the coastline or as submerged lands for purposes of the SLA. See State-
ment of Questions Presented, supra note 137, at 6-21.
139. The legal questions presented in United States v. Alaska include: (1) the legal
significance of the Dinkum Sands formation, see Statement of Questions Presented,
supra note 137, at 12-15; DeVorsey, Riddle of Dinkum, 58 GEOGRAPHICAL MAG. 192
(1986); DeVorsey, Dinkum Sands: Cartography and Controversy, 16 N. ENGINEER,
Mar. 1985, at 4; (2) the use of straight baselines in the delimitation, see Statement of
Questions Presented, supra note 137, at 6-8; (3) the status of submerged lands
shoreward of the barrier islands as either part of Alaska's internal waters or part of
United States territorial waters, see id. at 11-12; (4) the effect of the 1976 extension of
the ARCO Pier in Prudhoe Bay on the baseline used, see id. at 15-16; and (5) the effect
of offshore installations on Alaska's territorial jurisdiction, see id.
140. See United States v. Maine, 469 U.S. 504 (1985) (upholding the federal gov-
ernment decision on the role of offshore islands in drawing baselines); United States v.
Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975) (upholding the federal government decision on the status
of an Alaska inlet as historical bay). But see United States v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93
(1985) (rejecting federal government's finding and holding that a sound constituted
"historical bay" and was therefore within state territorial waters).
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the international boundary in the Beaufort Sea. 141 Canada claims that
the location of the boundary should be determined on the basis of a
tacit extension of the 141 degree west meridian line which was estab-
lished in an 1825 Anglo-Russian treaty142 and the 1866 transfer of the
Alaska territory between Russia and the United States. 43 The United
States rejects this claim and asserts that the equidistance principle of
marine delimitation should be applied to the Beaufort. 144 As with
other frontier disputes, this one would be academic if not for the per-
ceived value of the divisible area. At stake are some 6100 square nau-
tical miles of ocean territory, including the geologically significant
MARSH Anticlinal formation.145 Canada's Dome Petroleum has pro-
posed exploratory wells in this area.' 46
The question of continental shelf delimitation became important
as negotiations proceeded for an annex to the 1974 Canada-United
States Marine Contingency Plan ("Joint-Contingency Plan") 47 apply-
ing specifically to the Beaufort Sea ("Beaufort Annex"). 148 Modelled
generally on the Bonn Agreement, 149 the Joint-Contingency Plan, as
141. See Note, Delimiting Continental Shelf Boundaries in the Arctic: The United
States-Canada Beaufort Sea Boundary, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 221 (1981).
142. Convention Concerning the Limits of Respective Possessions on the North-
West Coast of America and Navigation of the Pacific Ocean, Feb. 16, 1825, Great
Britain-Russia, 75 Parry's T.S. 95.
143. Cession of Alaska, Mar. 30, 1867, United States-Russia, 15 Stat. 539, T.S. No.
301 (entered into force June 20, 1867). Canada's claim that the 141 West meridian
line constitutes the boundary is demonstrated by its extension of the jurisdictional
reach of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act to that line, see infra notes 156,
158 and accompanying text, and Canada's use of the sector theory in the Arctic.
144. See Note, supra note 141, at 242-43. For a general explanation of the equidis-
tance principle of marine delimitation, see id. at 234-35.
145. Interview with Dr. Robert Smith, Chief of the Marine Boundary and Re-
source Division, Office of the Geographer, U.S. Dep't of State (Mar. 14, 1986).
146. See Edmiston, supra note 6, at 17.
147. Joint Canada-United States Marine Pollution Contingency Plan for Spills of
Oil and Other Noxious Substances, June 19, 1974, United States-Canada, 25 U.S.T.
1280, T.I.A.S. No. 7861, superseded by Canada-United States Joint Marine Pollution
Contingency Plan, Sept. 15, 1983, United States-Canada, U.S. Coast Guard Publica-
tion No. TP-5341 (available at the U.S. Coast Guard, Dep't of Transp.) [hereinafter
Joint-Contingency Plan].
148. Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan: Annex IV, Aug. 30, 1977, United
States-Canada, 29 U.S.T. 2569, T.I.A.S. No. 8957 [hereinafter Beaufort Annex].
149. Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by
Oil, June 9, 1969, 704 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Aug. 9, 1969). This document
establishes zones of responsibility in the North Sea to facilitate the tracking and com-
bating of oil spills. One critical flaw of the agreement is that the designated zones of
responsibility do not conform with the parties' shelf sectors. A number of British
installations are, for example, located in other nations' responsibility zones. Though
the countries agree that the document covers blowouts, see generally R. BARSTON &
P. BIRNIE, THE MARITIME DIMENSION 116 (1980), lack of enforcement powers and
surveillance procedures might complicate cooperation.
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revised in 1983, represents an improvement upon the European accord
because of its inclusion of a funding provision requiring "the cost of
response operations [to] be borne by the party having jurisdiction over
the seabed activities involved." 150 If, however, an oil spill were to oc-
cur in the area encompassing the unresolved boundary dispute, there
could be a question as to which country was responsible. In case of
such an ambiguity, the Joint-Contingency Plan's Beaufort Annex pro-
vides that the matter will be arbitrated when there is confusion about
which nation will fund the clean-up operations. 151 The Joint-Contin-
gency Plan also contains detailed regulations for command, control,
and information exchange in the event of a pollution incident; estab-
lishes response centers and teams; and permits authorities in both
countries virtually to ignore the international boundary during the ac-
tual crisis.152 This last provision is crucial as neither party wanted to
establish a precedent by setting a boundary in any agreement.
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In the absence of a resolution to the jurisdictional conflict, Can-
ada and the United States have attempted to harmonize their domestic
legislation to provide a basis of relief for claimants in the other coun-
try. This effort has been only partially successful, notwithstanding the
United States' complaints in the late 1970's of the inadequate recourse
allowed under Canadian law. 154
Canadian compensation and liability provisions for offshore in-
stallations are detailed in the Oil and Gas Production and Conserva-
tion Act1 55 and the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act
(AWPPA).15 6 Both Acts impose absolute liability for oil pollution
150. See Joint-Contingency Plan, supra note 147, art. 202.3.
151. Beaufort Annex, supra note 148, art. N 100.2.2.
152. See Joint-Contingency Plan, supra note 147, art. 302.
153. Indeed, in the Beaufort Annex, supra note 148, no agreement was reached on
the relevant data base for determining responsibility zones. The United States version
of the Annex does have a map showing both the meridian line and equidistance lines.
See Joint-Contingency Plan, supra note 147, at app. I. This map is reprinted supra
p. 56. No such map appears in the Canadian printing of the Agreement.
154. See 1977 HousE DEBATES 5458, 5749-50, reprinted in 16 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
392-94 (1978) (comments by Mr. Leggatt and government response by Mr. Fleming);
see also deMestral, The Prevention of Pollution of the Marine Environment Arising
from Offshore Mining and Drilling, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 469, 491 (1979); Handl, State
Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons, 74
AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 547-48 (1980).
155. Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act, ch. 80, §§ 19-19.4, 1980-1983
Can. Stat. 2716, as amended by ch. 40, § 56, 1984 Can. Stat. 1484.
156. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. ch. 2 (lst Supp. 1970)
("AWPPA"). See generally Henkin, Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada Make-Or
Break-International Law?, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1971).
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damage on all offshore operators and require them to take all neces-
sary measures to mitigate or clean up spills on the Canadian continen-
tal margin. 157 The scope of the AWPPA, however, extends no further
than the 141st meridian in the Beaufort, the boundary claimed by
Canada,158 and neither Act addresses the issue of foreign claimants.
In 1980, the Canadian government entered into an agreement
with its licensees (including all interest holders) involved in Beaufort
drilling activities. This guaranty, known as the Canada Agreement, 159
extends to United States claimants approximately the same remedies
available to Canadians under the AWPPA. 16° The liability added by
this provision will cover damage caused west of the 141st meridian,
which, solely for the purposes of this agreement, serves as the United
States-Canada boundary. 161 Under both the AWPPA and the Canada
Agreement, the only valid defense is a showing that the claimant's
conduct either caused or contributed to the damages. 62 While the
limit of liability under the AWPPA is $C40,000,000,163 the Canada
Agreement limits potential liability to $C20,000,000.164 The Agree-
ment will compensate for all clean-up costs and all property or envi-
ronmental damage, but it is ambiguous on the issue of compensation
for purely economic losses. 165
157. See Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act, cl. 80, §§ 19.1-19.2, 1980-
1983 Can. Stat. 2716, 2717-20 as amended by ch. 40, § 56, 1984 Can. Stat. 1484,
1484-85; Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. ch. 2, §§ 6(2), 7(1) (1st
Supp. 1970).
158. See I. GAULT, PETROLEUM OPERATIONS ON THE CANADIAN CONTINENTAL
MARGIN 110 (1983).
159. The Canada Agreement was entered into June 1980, and its full text has never
been published. For extracts, see I. GAULT, supra note 158, at 79 n.240; I. GAULT,
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONTEXT OF PETROLEUM OPERATIONS IN CANADIAN
ARCTIC WATERS 30 (1983)[hereinafter I. GAULT, THE LEGAL CONTEXT].
160. See Canada Agreement, art. 1, reprinted in I. GAULT, supra note 158, at 79
n.240.
161. Canada Agreement, art. 2, cited in I. GAULT, THE LEGAL CONTEXT, supra
note 159, at 31. The Canadian government intended to amend the AWPPA to include
a provision benefiting U.S. claimants, but later decided that a guaranty agreement was
more expeditious in light of the planned offshore exploration. 1977 HOUSE DEBATES
5458, 5750, reprinted in 16 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 394 (1978).
162. In such cases, the claimant's recovery is reduced to the extent that his conduct
contributed to the incident. Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. ch. 2, § 9
(1st Supp. 1970); Canada Agreement, art. 2, cited in I. GAULT, THE LEGAL CON-
TEXT, supra note 159, at 31.
163. See Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Regulation, Amendment, 1981 Can.
Gaz. 447. "$C" represents Canadian dollars.
164. Canada Agreement, art. 2(d), cited in I. GAULT, THE LEGAL CONTEXT,
supra note 159, at 31.
165. Id. Article 2(d) of the Canada Agreement permits recovery of the following:
all costs and expenses of any action taken to repair or remedy any condition
that results from a deposit of waste or to reduce or mitigate any damage to
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Offshore operators in the Canadian Beaufort were required to
demonstrate their financial responsibility not only under the basic lia-
bility provisions imposed by the AWPPA and Oil and Gas Act,1 66 but
also under the added responsibility of the Canada Agreement. Cana-
dian operators were obliged to post indemnity bonds to cover the extra
amount of potential liability, and the government guaranteed the pay-
ment of the sums involved. This guaranty will hold the Canadian gov-
ernment liable on a subsidiary basis if the costs of a transfrontier
pollution incident are not met by the bonding arrangement. 167 The
Canada Agreement serves, in theory, the same essential purpose as the
United States OSPF, that of providing excess insurance. Unlike the
United States scheme, however, no actual fund was created by the Ca-
nadian government to meet its potential liability under the Canada
Agreement. Thus, questions regarding the Canadian government's
ability to fund recoveries under the Agreement remain unaddressed.
IV. INADEQUACIES OF CURRENT COMPENSATION SCHEMES
A. Domestic Issues
1. Federal Plan. While no claims have yet been presented to the
Fund, 168 it is but a matter of time before its provisions are triggered.
Recovery for an oil pollution incident in the Beaufort Sea would pres-
ent administrative difficulties for the managers of the Fund. Particu-
larly problematic would be the federal government's dual role as the
chief claimant for compensation of oil recovery costs and as public
trustee for the restoration of the environment. The OSPF mechanism
assumes a high level of coordination between various federal govern-
ment entities. The Departments of Transportation (Coast Guard), En-
ergy, and Interior would all have a role in any clean-up operation.
One source of tension might arise from Native American interests in
or destruction of life or property that results or may reasonably be expected
to result from such deposit or waste, to the extent that such costs and ex-
pense can be established to have been reasonably incurred in the
circumstances.
Id. The phrase, "may reasonably be expected to result," may encompass economic
losses and lost profits, or may merely refer to more speculative forms of actual
damages.
166. Oil and Gas Production and Conservation Act, ch. 80, § 19.3, 1980-1983 Can.
Stat. 2716, 2721; Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, R.S.C. ch. 2, § 8 (1st Supp.
1970).
167. See Handl, supra note 154, at 548.
168. Telephone interview with Frank Martin, Manager, Offshore Oil Pollution
Fund, U.S. Coast Guard (July 2, 1986).
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the region. 169 Their status was not contemplated by the legislature
and would represent a significant conflict.
Furthermore, the quantum of recovery appropriate for environ-
mental damage in the Beaufort's unique ecosystem 170 is likely to be
extraordinarily difficult to measure under the federal scheme that has
no graduated system to account for environmental sensitivity. Finally,
limiting the liability of offshore operators to $35,000,000 will be inade-
quate in the case of a catastrophic oil pollution incident in the area. 171
2. State Law. Alaska's approach to providing compensation for a
major pollution incident in the Beaufort warrants some criticism. 172
First, Alaska's required level of insurance for offshore operators, es-
tablished even before the OSPF came into force, is $35,000,000.173
This proof of financial responsibility is identical to that of the federal
scheme. 174 These financial responsibility provisions were indicative of
the statute's larger purpose of providing an " 'easy way for an individ-
ual Alaskan to collect for damages to his property or for loss of in-
come due to an oil spill.' -175 The possibility exists, however, that in
the event of an oil pollution incident, the required financial responsi-
bility amount will be exhausted by the state before individuals are able
to recover for their damages. Furthermore, the graduated penalty
provisions coupled with the unlimited liability to the state for cleanup,
removal, and restoration could produce damage awards to the state in
169. See Jones, The Development of Alaska's Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas
Resources and the Federal Trust Responsibility to Native Alaskans, 6 VA. J. NAT. RE-
SOURCES L. 53 (1986).
170. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
172. The Alaska scheme has not gone unchallenged. See Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3
(Alaska 1974). In Stock the Alaska Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's arguments
that the prohibitions against pollution discharges were void for vagueness and that the
penalty provisions violated due process by encouraging violators to plead guilty to a
more serious violation in order to receive a lighter penalty. The court, however, held
that the plaintiff had misconstrued the statute and had ignored the provision for ongo-
ing penalties against a willful violator for continued pollution discharges. Aside from
Stock, the Alaska oil pollution liability statute has not been challenged in Alaska
courts.
173. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
175. 1982 Op. Att'y Gen. Alaska No. 66-462 (May 13, 1982) (unpaginated) (avail-
able on LEXIS, States library, Allag file) (quoting remarks of William Publicover,
Deputy Director of Environmental Quality Operations, Alaska Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation, in testimony on the legislation). The Attorney General's
opinion also stated that "'[w]e want the injured party to be able to go to state court,
even small claims court, file his claim against someone who is attachable, someone
who does business in Alaska, or who has an agent in Alaska, and we seek timely
satisfaction of his claim.'" Id. (quoting Publicover). See also the legislative findings
reported at ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.758(a)(2) (1982).
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excess of the $35,000,000 limit. The problem, however, cannot be re-
dressed directly by any increase in financial responsibility require-
ments by the Alaska legislature. The federal Fund expressly preempts
any state requirements in excess of $35,000,000.176
The financial responsibility pitfall is aggravated by the fact that
private claimants are not given access to any state excess insurance
fund. 177 Though the state does maintain a mitigation account, as pre-
viously indicated, 178 its use is limited to expenses incurred by the state
and municipalities alone. Thus, private claimants under the Alaska
scheme are likely to be left without any recourse against polluters with
limited assets. Even if they were given access, current civil penalty
provisions that fund the state account seem to contemplate only low-
level point-source pollution. 179 A blowout from an offshore explora-
tory well could spew thousands of barrels into the ocean. The penalty
per gallon, under such circumstances, quickly could escalate to a level
beyond $100,000,000. Yet the fund only allows for collection of up to
$100,000,000 in penalties. 80 Clearly, if a blowout of this proportion
occurred, more would be needed in order to compensate adequately all
private claimants injured, in addition to compensating the state for
cleanup, removal, and restoration.
3. Proposed Solutions. There are several policy changes that
Alaska can pursue regardless of the application of the preemption doc-
trine in the oil pollution area. These include increased penalties for
operations within state territorial waters that recognize the special en-
vironmental sensitivity of the Beaufort, expansion of the financing and
availability of the state's own mitigation account, and recognition of
the particular interests of the native peoples in the area. None of these
initiatives would run afoul of federal preemption, as would the state's
unilateral increase of operators' financial responsibility requirements.
If these initiatives were effectuated, an increase in offshore operator
financial responsibility would not be necessary.
Judicial characterization of the Beaufort marine environment will
be critical to the level of penalty collectable. 81 While the Beaufort
176. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
178. Id.
179. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
180. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.758(e) (1982).
181. The amount of the penalty per gallon of oil spilled varies according to the
characterization of the environment. For freshwater, the amount of the penalty is $10
per gallon; for confined saltwater, $2.50 per gallon; and for unconfined saltwater, $1
per gallon. Id. § 46.03.758(b)(1).
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clearly is "an unconfined saltwater environment," that would cur-
rently be entitled to the lowest penalty, 18 2 it is also a sensitive marine
habitat for endangered species such as the Bowhead whale.183 In or-
der to generate additional penalties in the event of a spill, the statute
should either account for environmentally sensitive unconfined
saltwater areas or at least characterize the Beaufort as a "confined
saltwater" area.18 4
Furthermore, the Alaska legislature should open up the use of the
state's mitigation account to meet the needs of private claimants in
addition to serving as an auxillary fund for clean-up expenses. This
would require expansion of financing for the account and specific pro-
cedural provisions authorizing successful private claimants to draw
upon it up to a specified limit. Some increased financing would result
from classification of the Beaufort as an environmentally sensitive
area. Another avenue might be to raise the $100,000,000 penalty
cap.18 5 Neither of these measures should be seen as conflicting with
federal law, provided that the statute also incorporated a provision
clarifying that any funds recovered from the account would be de-
ducted from possible recovery under the federal fund and vice-
versa.'
8 6
In order to address fully the needs of private claimants, special
recognition of native interests would be required.187 The needs of the
Inupiat people who inhabit the Beaufort shore might not coincide with
those of state authorities leading clean-up operations. Expanding the
use of the state mitigation account to meet the needs of these commu-
nities would also seem to be well within the province of the state.
Such an item, omitted from the federal agenda, would at least provide
the natives on the Beaufort shore a more meaningful level of compen-
sation at the state level and, perhaps, provide the incentive for the
federal government to follow suit.
182. Id. § 46.03.758(b)(1)(C).
183. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
184. ALASKA STAT. 46.03.758(/(2) (1982) provides: "'Confined saltwater envi-
ronment' means a bay, sound or other partially enclosed saltwater body in which
flushing through tidal or current action is significantly restricted."
185. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text and text accompanying note
180.
186. 43 U.S.C. § 1820(a) (1982).
187. The OSPF requires that the United States Attorney General bring an action
on behalf of a group of claimants. Id. § 1813(b)(7). But see id. § 1813(c) (permitting
any member of such group to bring class action if Attorney General fails to bring an
action). The OSPF assumes, however, that the interests of the group of claimants and
the federal government will be consonant, an assumption that has been disputed in
past litigation concerning OCS leases in the Beaufort. See North Slope Borough v.
Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611-13 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Jones, supra note 169, at 89-100.
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In light of the federal restriction on requirements of financial re-
sponsibility, 188 it seems that the financing of the Fund is particularly
important in providing an adequate scheme for compensation. While
increasing the penalty limitation in the Alaska scheme above
$100,000,000 would not be a viable option if the state limitation were
held to be preempted by the federal scheme's $10,000 limitation, such
an application of the preemption doctrine is unlikely. 189 As long as
the Alaska penalty scheme does not directly demand higher proof of
financial responsibility and does not allow double compensation, such
an increase probably could withstand any preemption by the OSPF. 90
B. United States-Canadian Relations
Although it provides needed guidelines for immediate clean-up
action in the event of an oil spill in the Beaufort, the Joint-Contin-
gency Plan leaves several questions unanswered. For example, it pro-
vides no mechanism for payment of damages caused by a spill.
Moreover, in the case that either or both parties were to proceed with
exploratory drilling in the Beaufort's disputed area and a pollution
incident occurred, the Joint-Contingency Plan does not provide for the
imposition of liability on the nation authorizing the offending installa-
tion. Until the location of the marine boundary is determined, the
Joint Plan cannot be invoked as a comprehensive compensation or lia-
bility regime between the two nations.
The express goal of Canada's modification of its liability and com-
pensation law was to benefit Alaska claimants by establishing reci-
procity between the pollution statutes of the United States and
Canada. 191 The treatment of foreign claimants under the OSPF does
not necessarily represent a truly reciprocal regime with its Canadian
counterpart. Unlike the provisions for natural resources under United
States control,1 92 there is some question as to the proper foreign claim-
ant under the OSPF for damage done to natural resources under the
control of a foreign government. The OSPF defines foreign claimants
as "any person residing in a foreign country, the government of a for-
eign country, or any agency or political subdivision thereof."' 93 In
light of the specificity with which the OSPF defines the exclusive
188. 43 U.S.C. § 1820(b) (1982).
189. Id. § 1812(d)(3)(A).
190. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
191. See 1977 HoUSE DEBATES 5458, 5750, reprinted in 16 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.
394 (1978).
192. The OSPF specifically designates the President as the exclusive claimant re-
garding damage to natural resources over which the federal government has sovereign
rights. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(3) (1982). Similarly, states are the sole claimants for dam-
age to natural resources within their management. Id.
193. Id. § 1811(11).
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United States claimants for damage to natural resources, the absence
of a parallel provision designating either the federal or provincial gov-
ernment of a foreign country as the proper claimant for damage to
natural resources makes the practical application of the Fund to for-
eign claimants somewhat ambiguous. 194
In addition to confronting a narrower scope of recoverable dam-
ages than that found in the Canada Agreement, 195 foreign claimants
must also fulfill a number of procedural tests. First, a foreign claimant
must prove that the "oil pollution occurred in or on the territorial sea,
navigable waters or internal waters, or adjacent shoreline of a foreign
country of which the claimant is a resident." 96 This requirement po-
tentially precludes claims for loss of profits from a commercial fishery
located beyond a twelve-mile territorial sea. Claimants must also
prove that the oil was discharged from a facility on the United States
shelf' 97 and that they were not otherwise compensated for their
losses. 198
Most importantly, the OSPF requires that the foreign state pro-
vide similar, reciprocal remedies for United States claimants. 199 Ar-
guably, the Canada Agreement provides just such a remedy in the
Beaufort. Although the two compensation schemes are not symmetri-
cal in coverage, they are generally equivalent in other respects. One
critical exception is that the Canada Agreement provides for only
$C20,000,000 of compensation specifically available to foreign claim-
ants.2°° The whole of the United States Fund, up to $200,000,000,
presumably would be available to foreign claimants in the case of a
194. Compare id. § 1813(b)(3) with id. § 1813(b)(6).
195. See supra note 159. Also, Congress specifically ruled out compensation from
the Fund to a foreign government for lost tax revenues. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
1450, 1731.
196. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(b)(6)(A) (1982).
197. Id. § 1813(b)(6)(C). This provision would also apply to spills from operations
in Alaska state waters.
198. Id. § 1813(b)(6)(B).
199. Id. § 1813(b)(6)(D). The rationale for this provision was made clear in the
legislative history:
The intention of [the OSPF] is to protect domestic interests. To provide for
payment to foreign countries or non-U.S. residents without a reciprocal ar-
rangement in the foreign country would be unfair. Thus, clean-up costs or
damages are not to be awarded to a foreign country or a non-U.S. resident
unless there is a treaty or executive agreement authorizing payment of an
equivalent or similar remedy for U.S. claimants for discharges off that for-
eign country's shelf.
H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 184, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1590.
200. Although $C40,000,000 is available under the AWPPA, see supra text accom-
panying note 163, these additional funds would be available to U.S. claimants only
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catastrophic incident. Additionally, the Canada Agreement provides
only a supplemental measure of liability; no other compensation funds
could be used to meet the demands of United States claimants.20 1
In light of the major disparity in compensation available under
the two schemes, an American court probably would limit payment
from the United States Fund to the maximum amount authorized by
the Canadian Agreement, $C20,000,000. Reciprocity thus would be
maintained even without a formal treaty or executive agreement be-
tween Canada and the United States. This remedy could not be pre-
empted by any coordinate state's compensation scheme.
The United States government always should be able to recover
from a party responsible for an oil spill the money that the govern-
ment used to reimburse a foreign country for that nation's clean-up
costs. Accordingly, the Second Circuit ruled in In re Oswego Barge20 2
that the FWPCA did not preempt the federal government's claim
against offenders for money which it reimbursed to Canada for clean-
up costs in Canadian waters for a vessel-source pollution incident.20 3
By analogy, the OSPF should allow a disbursement to compensate for
Canadian clean-up costs in the Beaufort, provided that, as a threshold
matter, the Canada Agreement offers reciprocal terms. The decisive
issue was whether the relevant United States statute preempted the
remedy.2°4 The OSPF probably should not be construed to preempt
reimbursements to a foreign claimant for either clean-up costs or pay-
ments of damages.
Until the international boundary delimitation is concluded, the
process of harmonizing United States and Canadian law to provide
reciprocal remedies will continue to be inadequate. It is apparent that
the coordinate provisions of Canada's AWPPA and the United States'
OSPF accidentally have interconnected to provide a narrow and finan-
cially limited remedy. The first step toward a meaningful resolution
would be for the Secretary of State to certify the Canada Agreement as
a reciprocal arrangement for the purposes of the OSPF. Next, the
governments should coordinate the actual substantive elements of the
two regimes. The most important component of this process should
after the demands of the Canadian claimants were met. By contrast, there is no indi-
cation that, under the OSPF, foreign claims would be subordinated to domestic claims
in the allocation of the $200,000,000 fund. See 43 U.S.C. § 1814(b)(2) (1982).
201. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
202. 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981).
203. Id. at 344-45 (citing 116 CONG. REc. 9327 (1970) (remarks by Representative
Cramer in debate on FWPCA, asserting that claims made by foreign countries would
not be subject to limitation of liability)).
204. Id. ("The FWPCA does not 'speak to' the problem of polluting foreign wa-
ters, and therefore no presumption of preemption arises.").
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be the inclusion of a Canadian provision for higher compensation lim-
its for the benefit of foreign claimants.
V. CONCLUSION: A PRESCRIPTION FOR CONSISTENCY
Liability and compensation for offshore oil pollution in the
Beaufort Sea is not yet fully developed. The potential for an interna-
tional environmental disaster demonstrates the need to analyze the
legal remedies available to victims in the context of overlapping
jurisdiction.
The essential ingredient to developing a successful compensation
system that can accommodate the risks and rewards of oil exploration
in the Arctic is the resolution of the existing jurisdictional disputes.
For Canada and the United States, this is a matter of diplomacy. The
greatest potential for successful resolution of these jurisdictional
problems lies in intensive negotiation by both nations.
When the current oil glut dissipates and petroleum prices begin to
rise again, offshore exploration and production in the Beaufort Sea in-
evitably will resume. Only when this happens will the need for a reso-
lution of this international dispute be apparent. Settlement of these
issues, however, should not be delayed until the imminent potential for
catastrophe exists and economic and political interests have come into
greater conflict. A successful outcome may depend on achieving an
agreement with Canada while the issue has the attention of the United
States government and before the value of oil rights in the Beaufort
Sea rises again or the collateral issue of Arctic sovereignty is involved.
As for federal preemption, the current liberal approach toward
state legislation can accommodate an expansion of remedies more tai-
lored to the needs of the region. The Alaska legislature is by far a
better forum than Congress for classification of the Beaufort as an en-
vironmentally sensitive region and for recognition of the Inupiats' spe-
cial needs. Augmenting the financing and availability of the state
mitigation account would better protect the interests of all parties.
Raising the $100,000,000 cap on the penalty provisions would also
serve this purpose, as well as provide the incentive for more careful
operations by major offshore oil operators. These changes will enhance
oil spill compensation in the Beaufort in a more direct fashion than
Alaska's current attempt to extend its jurisdictional authority. While
Alaska's jurisdictional claims may be rejected by the Supreme Court,
such a resolution need not be fatal to attempts to protect against the
effects of offshore operations. Alaska can sacrifice its jurisdictional
claims for greater freedom of action. Federal-state relations in this
area need not be "all or nothing."
Incremental improvements in offshore operations in the Beaufort
Sea would be acceptable if accompanied by careful plannning. The
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hurried tempo of exploration in the late 1970's, the subsequent bust,
and expected developments in the future all indicate, however, that the
pace of operations in the Arctic is anything but predictable. The de-
velopment of a sufficient liability and compensation scheme will pro-
vide much needed protection for Alaska in the regulation of an
industry operating just within the margin of safety on the last pristine
American frontier.

